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LIMITATIONS ON THE INTEREST DEDUCTION
DENcis P. BwDELL
Over the years various legislative, judicial, and administrative limita-
tions have been imposed on the deduction allowed by section 163 for
interest. One category of these limitations have arisen out of the in-
herent requirements of the deduction: namely, that the amount for
which a deduction is claimed must be interest on indebtedness and must
be paid or accrued by the taxpayer during the taxable year.
The other main category of limitations on the interest deduction has
been directed to situations in which it was believed that the use of the
interest deduction gave rise to a tax abuse. Until recent years, the con-
cern has generally been with what were considered to be abuses of the
interest deduction of specific, limited types of situations. For example,
limitations were imposed on the deductibility of interest on indebtedness
earned in connection with the purchase of certain life insurance, en-
dowment or annuity contracts (section 264), on the deductibility
of interest on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry
tax-exempt bonds (section 265(2)), and on interest paid in certain
situations involving related taxpayers (section 267). In addition, the
courts have developed limitations on the interest deduction in situations
involving tax-savings transactions. One of these limitations disallows
the deduction on the basis that the tax-saving transaction was a sham
and did not involve the creation of a valid indebtedness. Another judi-
cially developed limitation disallows the deduction on the basis that
the loan in question was incurred solely for the purpose of obtaining
an interest deduction and served no other purpose. This limitation is
applicable even though the transaction in question was not a sham
and involved a valid indebtedness.
Since the late 1960's, however, concern with the interest deduction
as a tax-saving or tax shelter device has become much broader and has
encompassed the use of the interest deduction in a more general sense.
This is seen in the limitations imposed on the deductibility of prepaid
interest and on the deductibility of interest paid in connection with
investments and in the proposed limitations on the deductibility of
personal interest.
Inberent Requirements of Interest Deduction
Although the interest deduction is not subject to the types of limita-
tions found in the case of other deductions, such as a requirement that
the amount paid be reasonable, that it be ordinary and necessary, or
that there be a business purpose for the payment, the deduction does
require that there be a valid indebtedness requiring interest and that
the amount of interest for which a deduction is claimed be paid or
accrued within the taxable year.1 The treatment by the Internal Reve-
24A Mertens, Law of Federal lncore Taxation, S 26.01 and cases cited therein.
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nue Service of points paid by a borrower to a financial institution in
connection with obtaining a home mortgage and of finance or carry-
ing charges imposed in connection with installment purchases of mer-
chandise are illustrative of the basic requirement that the amount paid
must indeed constitute interest; i.e., an amount paid as compensation
for the use of borrowed money.2
The Service originally held that mortgage points were not de-
ductible because the payment at least in part might be a payment to
the lending institution for services rendered by the institution in con-
nection with the mortgage loan, such as charges for title reports, escrow,
appraisal, and notary fees and charges for preparing the necessary
papers.8 The Service then modified its position to recognize the fact
that points can indeed constitute interest; i.e., an additional payment
for the use of money. It held that, if the lending institution separately
charged the borrower for the services it rendered in connection with
the mortgage loan, the points paid by a cash basis borrower could be
deducted as interest in the year paid.4
In the case of finance charges imposed in connection with installment
purchases of merchandise, the Service initially allowed a deduction
for the interest portion of the finance charge only if it was separately
stated.6 Since merchants, however, because of usury law considera-
tions, did not usually separate the finance charges they made into the
component representing interest and the component representing a
charge by the merchant for services rendered in connection with the
extension of credit, the finance charges generally were not considered
by the Revenue Service to be deductible interest. Limited relief was
provided by Congress in 1954 when, in section 163(b), it allowed
a deduction for that portion of a finance charge under an installment
purchase contract equal to 6 percent of the average unpaid balance.
This limited recognition that finance charges are at least in part
interest continued to be the rule until 1971 when the Revenue Service
began to liberalize its views with respect to finance and carrying
charges.6 First, it allowed the deduction of finance charges in a situa-
tion where it was clear that the charge represented only interest and
2Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Comu'r, 284 U.S. 552 (1932) and Deputy v.
duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
SRev. Rul. 67-297, 1967-2 C3. 87.
4 Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54. In Rev. Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 C.B. 29, it was
held that points paid by a cash basis taxpayer did not constitute prepaid interest
which caused a material distortion of income and, accordingly, were deductible
in the year paid. Accrual basis taxpayers must deduct interest including points over
the period of the loan, regardless of when the interest is paid. Rev. Rul. 68-643,
1968-2 C3. 76.
5 See H. Rep. No 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1954).
I See Rev. Rul. 67-62, 1967-1 C3. 44.
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not compensation for services.7 Then after an initial reluctance, the
Revenue Service in effect moved to the view that any consumer credit
carrying charge which is specified as a finance charge under the Truth
in Lending Act 8 and is stated as an annual percentage rate constitutes
deductible interest.9 The Truth in Lending Act, adopted in 1968, in
effect treats all charges for consumer credit such as interest, service
charges, credit investigation fees, and loan fees as a finance charge
representing the cost to the consumer of the credit he is obtaining.
The Act requires the total amount of these charges to be expressed
as a finance charge at an annual percentage rate. Accordingly, at this
point, finance charges imposed on consumers who purchase goods or
services on credit, such as in the case of revolving charge accounts,' 0
oil company credit cards,"1 and retail installment contracts,12 are con-
sidered by the Revenue Service to represent deductible interest.
Illustrative of the basic requirement of the interest deduction that the
interest must be paid or accrued in the taxable year is the treatment
of discount loans. A discount loan is one in which the lender, rather
than advancing the face amount of the loan to the borrower, deducts
all or a portion of the interest due on the loan and then advances to
the borrower the remaining 'balance of the sum borrowed. In some
cases, the amount deducted may be only the points in connection with
a mortgage loan. In other cases, it may be the entire amount of in-
terest due over the term of the loan. In each of these cases, the bor-
rower is not treated as having paid the interest in question in the
year in which the loan is made and, accordingly, is not allowed to
deduct the interest for that year. Instead, a cash basis borrower is
treated as having paid the interest over the life of the loan as he in
fact repays the principal amount of the loan which includes the interest
charge and, thus, is allowed to deduct the interest in question over
that period.'3 Accordingly, particularly in the case of points paid
by an individual with respect to a mortgage loan, particularly on his
principal residence, it behooves the borrower who wishes to obtain
a current interest deduction for the points to separately pay the lender
the amount of the points (such as by a separate closing cost item at
settlement), rather than having the points deducted by the lender from
the amount of the mortgage loan.
7 Rev. Rul. 71-98, 1971-1 C.B. 57, involving a bank credit card plan under which
participating merchants paid the bank all its costs in respect to the plan except
interest which was charged to the credit card holders.
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t.
9 Rev. Rul. 72-315, 1972-1 C.B. 49.
10 Rev. Rul. 72-315, supra.
11 Rev. Rul. 73-136, 1973-1 C.B. 68.
1Rev. Rul. 73-137, 1973-1 C.B. 68.18 Burton Foster, 32 T.C.M. 243 (1973); Rev. Rul. 75-12, I.R.B. 1975-2, 6.
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Prepaid Interest
In the late 1960's the matter of prepaid interest became the focus
of a broad-scale concern with the interest deduction. For many
years, the Revenue Service had allowed a cash basis taxpayer to cur-
rently deduct up to five years prepaid interest.14 In 1968, the Revenue
Service changed its view and held that prepaid interest could not be
currently deducted if it resulted in a material distortion of income.1 5
In addition, the Service stated that it would consider a material dis-
tortion of income to result in any case in which interest was prepaid
for a period greater than 12 months after the taxable year of payment.
In these cases, the Service required the prepayment of interest to be
allocated over the taxable years to which it related.
In reversing its position on prepaid interest, the Service stated that
it was concerned with the abuses which had arisen and that all interest
prepayments were to be examined to ascertain if they resulted in a
material distortion of income. In 1969, the House Ways and Means
Committee expressed its agreement with the Service's concern in this
regard and with its revised position regarding the deductibility of
prepaid interest.16
Subsequently, the Service's position on the deductibility of prepaid
interest by cash basis taxpayers has been considered and in general
approved by the Tax Court. In one case the court upheld the Service's
disallowance of the deduction for five years of prepaid interest,17
and in another case the court disallowed the deduction of one year's
interest which was prepaid on December 29. Instead, a deduction was
allowed only for the ratable portion (3/365) of the prepayment al-
locable to the year of payment.18
Notwithstanding the Tax Court's general approval of the Revenue
Service's position on the deductibility of prepaid interest, current con-
gressional concern has been expressed on this matter. In connection
with its formulation of the Tax Reform Bill of 1975, the House Ways
and Means Committee considered the subject of prepaid interest and
indicated its belief that prepaid interest had become an important tax
shelter device to investors who wished to obtain "year-end artificial
14 I.T. 3740, 1945 C.B. 109. Earlier, the Service had acquiesced in John D.
Fackler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939) (A., 1931-1 (Part I) C.B. 11) and Court Holding
Co., 2 T.C. 531 (1943) (A. 1943 C3. 5) which had allowed the deduction of pre-
paid interest.
15 Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76. Also, the acquiescences in Fackler and Court
Holding Co. were withdrawn and nonacquiescences substituted. 1968-2 C.B. 3.
Rev. Rul. 68-643 applies to interest prepayments made after November 25, 1968,
other than prepayments for not more than a 5-year period made pursuant to a
legal obligation incurred prior to November 26, 1968.
16H. Rep. No. 91-413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
17Andrew A. Sandor, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), on appeal to 9th Cir.
18 G. Douglas Burck, 63 T.C. 556 (1975).
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16sses". The Committee expressed concern, as it did in other contexts,
involving *so-called "accelerated deductions", that a deduction for pre-
paid interest could allow a taxpayer to offset, and thereby defer, his
tax on unrelated income rather than offsetting the tax on the income
from the investment in connection with which the interest was prepaid,
which income generally would arise in later years. The Committee
also felt that there was still a substantial uncertainty under present law
as to the deductibility of prepaid interest because both the Tax Court
and the Revenue Service required that a case-by-case determination be
made with respect to the deductibility of prepaid interest.19
Accordingly, the Committee included in its tax reform bill a pro-
vision which in general would require a cash basis taxpayer to utilize
the accrual method in the case of prepaid interest.20 Under the bill,
any payment of interest which is properly allocable to a taxable year
following the year of payment would have to be capitalized by a cash
basis taxpayer and treated as paid in the years to which it is properly
allocable; i.e., the years in which it actually is a charge for the use
of borrowed money during the year. This rule would be applicable
without regard to whether allowing the prepaid interest to be de-
ducted in the year of payment would materially distort the taxpayer's
income for that year.2 1
The Committee also indicated that points to the extent they other-
wise qualify as interest for tax purposes are to be treated as a pre-
payment of interest and with one exception are to be deductible only
under the accrual method provided by the bill. The one exception to
this rule would allow points to be currently deducted by a cash basis
taxpayer if they are paid in connection with an indebtedness which
is both incurred in connection with the purchase or improvement of
his principal residence and is also secured by that principal residence.22
Presumably, in determining the taxable years to which an interest
prepayment is properly allocable, a taxpayer would not be required
in all cases to allocate the prepayment ratably over the term of the
loan. For example, where principal and interest on a loan are paid on
19 H. Rep. No. 94-658, 94th Cong, 1st Sess. 98-99 (1975). The House Ways and
Means Cogmmittee's report on the Tax Reform Bill of 1975 is hereinafter referred
to as H. Rep. No. 94-658.
20 H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 205 (1975). Hereinafter, the Tax Reform
Bill of 1975, as reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on November
7, 1975, is referred to as "H.R. 10612." The limitation on the deductibility of pre-
paid interest contained in 5 205 of H.R. 10612 would apply to amounts paid after
September 16, 1975, in taxable years ending after that date, except in the case
of amounts paid before January 1, 1976, pursuant to certain binding commitments
made prior to September 17, 1975. In addition, such limitation would be appli-
cable to all taxpayers, not just individuals.
21 H. Rep. No. 94-658, 100.
22H. Rep. No. 94-658, 101, and 5 461(g), as proposed to be added by H.R.
10612, 5 205(a).
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a combined level payment basis over the term of the loan, the interest
does not accrue ratably over the term of the loan but instead is pro-
portionately greater in the earlier years of the loan since a proportion-
ately greater amount is being borrowed in those years. Accordingly, if
points were paid by the taxpayer in connection with such a level pay-
ment loan, and the loan did not relate to the taxpayer's principal resi-
dence, it would appear that the taxpayer should be allowed to allocate
the points over the years of the loan in proportion to the relative
amount of interest paid by the taxpayer in each year by means of
the level payments. Although the Committee did not focus on this
specific question, it did recognize the fact that interest on a level pay-
ment loan is proportionately greater in the earlier years of the loan.2
The corollary of this, of course, is that the outstanding principal
amount of such a loan is proportionately greater in the earlier years
of the loan. Since the basic thrust of the proposed prepaid interest rule
in the Committee's bill is to treat prepaid interest as paid by the tax-
payer "in the periods in which (and to the extent that) the interest
represents a charge for the use.., of borrowed money during each
such period",24 it would follow that an appropriate nonratable alloca-
tion of the prepaid interest should be permitted.
Limitation on the Deduction of Nonbusiness Interest
During its consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress
expressed a much broader concern with the use of the interest deduc-
tion as a tax-saving or tax shelter device than it had in the past. As
part of that consideration, Congress examined the tax returns of a
number of very high income taxpayers who had paid no tax. It
noted that a substantial number of those taxpayers had utilized large
interest deductions in reducing their tax liability to zero.2 Congress
also stated that in an investment context the allowance of the interest
deduction could result in a mismatching of income and expense and
presented an opportunity for taxpayers to convert ordinary income
into capital gain income. These results could occur, for example, where
an individual acquired an investment, such as stock, that produced
little current income and that would result in capital gains income when
sold, with the proceeds of a large loan and then took a current deduction
for the interest on the loan.26 This was considered by Congress to be
an abuse of the interest deduction. Accordingly, for taxable years
beginning after 1971, Congress in section 163(d) limited the amount
of investment interest which an individual would be allowed to
currently deduct.27
23H. Rep. No. 94-658, 100-1.
24 H. Rep. No. 94-658, 100.
25H. Rep. No. 91-413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
26 H. Rep. No. 91-413 (Part I), supra, 72.
2 7 Excess investment interest was a tax preference item for purposes of the
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It is possible, however, that the limitation imposed in 1969 on the
deductibility of investment interest will turn out to be merely the
forerunner of an even broader limitation on the interest deduction.
During its consideration in recent months of the Tax Reform Bill of
1975, the House Ways and Means Committee focused its attention
on the deduction of personal interest; for example, the interest incurred
by an individual on a home mortgage or in connection with credit pur-
chases of consumer goods, such as automobiles and appliances. The
Committee indicated that to some extent the deduction for personal
interest may be viewed as a tax shelter device in that it permits a
taxpayer to shelter income from his income-producing activities by
the use of deductions that are unrelated to that income. The Committee
also expressed its belief that a deduction should not be allowed for
interest on a loan used to acquire luxury items and to thereby provide
the taxpayer with a standard of living that is clearly out of the
ordinary."
As a result, the Committee included in its tax reform bill a generally
applicable limitation on the deduction of personal interest, which in
addition would further restrict the deduction allowed for investment
interest.29
The Limitation
Under present law an individual may not deduct investment interest
for a taxable year to the extent it is greater than the sum of $25,000,
his net investment income, his net long-term capital gains on investment
property, his out-of-pocket losses on net leased property, and one-
half the amount of his investment interest in excess of these other
amounts.80
The Ways and Means Committee's tax reform bill would revise this
limitation and extend it to personal interest in the following manner: 1
First, it would limit an individual taxpayer's deduction for personal
interest to $12,000 a year. Personal interest in excess of that amount
could not be offset against any other type of income including in-
vestment income and could not be deducted in any other taxable
year. In the case of an individual taxpayer's investment interest, his
deduction would be limited to the excess of $12,000 over the amount
10-percent minimum tax on tax preferences (sec. 56) for taxable years beginning
before 1972.
28 H. Rep. No. 94-658, 102.
29 H.R. 10612, 5 206, amending sec. 163(d). The new and revised limitation
would apply with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975,
except in the case of certain loans incurred prior to September 11, 1975. See
proposed sec. 164(d)(7), H.R. 10612, S 206(a).
SOSec. 163(d)(1). The $25,000 amount is reduced to $12,500 in the case of a
married individual filing a separate return and to zero in the case of a trust.
31 H.R. 10612, S 206. The $12,000 amount is reduced to $6,000 in the case of a
married individual filing a separate return and to zero in the case of a trust. It
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of his personal interest, plus the sum of his net investment income, his
net long-term capital gains on investment property, and his out-of-
pocket losses on net leased property. Investment interest in excess
of the sum of these amounts could not be deducted currently but could
be carried over to subsequent taxable years.
Under both present law and the proposed limitation on nonbusiness
interest, if a taxpayer's investment interest is in excess of the specified
dollar amount ($25,000 or $12,000 minus the amount of the taxpayer's
personal interest, respectively) plus the amount of his net investment
income and his out-of-pocket losses on net leased property, he is
considered to have used his excess investment interest to offset his
long-term capital gains on investment property. To the extent this
occurs, the capital gains lose their character as such and instead are
treated as ordinary income for purposes of the alternative capital gains
tax, the 50-percent capital gains deduction, and the 10-percent minimum
tax.82
The limitation imposed under present law on investment interest
is of relatively narrow application since it allows taxpayers to deduct
up to $25,000 per year of this type of interest even if they do not
have any investment income or capital gains. It, thus, is obvious that
before the limitation becomes applicable the taxpayer must have a
very large loan for investment purposes. In addition, a taxpayer with
the ability to secure a loan of this magnitude often will have substantial
amounts of investment income, which further protects the taxpayer's
investment interest deduction. The nonbusiness interest limitation which
would be imposed under the Ways and Means Committee's tax reform
bill, however, would have a substantially broader application because
of the reduced amount of the dollar limitation on the deduction and
because of the inclusion of personal interest within the limitation.
Personal Interest
"Personal interest" is defined for purposes of the proposed nonbusi-
ness interest limitation as any interest other than investment interest
should be noted that under the Committee's bill, the prepaid interest rule con-
tained in § 205 would be applied first to allocate the prepaid interest to the ap-
propriate taxable years. The amount of the prepaid interest so allocated to each
such taxable year would then be subject to the other limitations contained in
H.R. 10612 which could limit the interest deduction. These include the proposed
sec. 163 (d) limitation on the deduction of nonbusiness interest and the proposed
limitation on artificial accounting losses (H.R. 10612, § 101). The latter rule
would particularly affect the deduction of construction period interest paid or
accrued with respect to real property. The interest deduction could also be
limited to some extent by the proposed revision of the 10-percent minimum tax
applicable to individuals (H.R. 10612, § 301) which, among other things, would
treat the amount of an individual taxpayer's itemized deductions, which, of
course, could include interest, in excess of 70 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income as a tax preference item subject to the minimum tax.
32Sec. 163(d) (5) and proposed sec. 163(d) (8), H.R. 10612, 6 206.
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and interest which is related to the taxpayer's trade or business.3 Per-
sonal interest, thus, would include interest on installment purchases of
consumer goods or services, on vacation loans and on student educa-
tional loans.34 It also would include interest on home mortgage loans,
home mortgage prepayment penalties,3 5 and points paid in connection
with a home mortgage loan. Points paid with respect to a mortgage
loan on the taxpayer's principal residence which are excepted from the
application of the proposed prepaid interest limitation discussed above
nevertheless would be treated as personal interest subject to the pro-
posed nonbusiness interest limitation.
Personal interest also would include interest paid on tax deficiencies.
Since in this type of situation the amount paid by the taxpayer during
the year could represent interest for a number of years during which
period the taxpayer had been contesting the deficiency, the application
of the nonbusiness interest limitation to the interest could be particularly
onerous, especially in view of the fact that no carryover would be
allowed for any personal interest in excess of the limitation. Assuming
a limitation on the deduction of personal interest is sound from a tax
policy standpoint, it is questionable whether interest on tax deficiencies
should be subject to the limitation. This type of interest does not in-
volve a tax shelter potential or the "problem" of taxpayers deducting
interest on credit purchases of luxury items which was the focus of the
Committee's concern with the personal interest deduction. 6 Accord-
ingly, it would appear that interest on tax deficiencies should be ex-
cluded from the scope of the limitation, as was done in the case of
interest imposed on installment payments of Federal estate tax.37
Investment Interest
Under present law the investment interest limitation is imposed on
"interest paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to
purchase or carry property held for investment." 38 Thus, to be con-
sidered investment interest, the borrowing must be for the proscribed
purpose and the property purchased or carried with the loan must be
investment property. To determine whether a loan has the proscribed
purpose, the proposed regulations essentially adopt a direct tracing
test.39 A loan will be considered as made for business or personal, rather
33 Proposed sec. 163 (d) (4) (A), H.R. 10612, S 206.
34 H. Rep. No. 94-658, 103.
3 Mortgage prepayment penalties are considered by the Revenue Service to
constitute deductible interest. Rev. Rul. 57-198, 1957-1 C.B. 94. See also Rev.
Rul. 73-137, 1973-1 CB. 68, which holds that prepayment charges imposed pur-
suant to a retail installment contract constitute deductible interest.
36 H. Rep. No. 94-658, 102.
W Proposed sec. 163 (d) (5) (D), H.R. 10612, § 206.
8 Sec. 163(d) (3) (D).
8 Prop. Reg. § 1.57-2 (b) (1) (iii). Since the definitional provisions of section
163(d), under which regulations have not as yet been proposed, are in most
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than investment, purposes if the proceeds of the loan can be directly
traced to a particular business or personal activity or property. The
use of the proceeds of a loan as payment for a particular activity or
property, or the simultaneous borrowing and expending of substantially
identical amounts by the taxpayer, can be used to establish the required
tracing.
It is further provided that a loan is to be presumed incurred or
continued for the proscribed purpose (i.e., to acquire or carry invest-
ment property) if the loan proceeds cannot be directly traced to a
particular business or personal activity or property. In addition, a
"substance over form" exception to the direct tracing rule is provided
in the proposed regulations. Under this exception, a loan is considered
to have the proscribed purpose if "it is clear that in substance such
indebtedness was incurred to purchase or carry investment property,"
even though the loan is directly traceable to specific non-investment
property, such as purchase money mortgage on the taxpayer's home.40
The second aspect of the present definition of investment interest
is whether the property for which the loan was incurred or con-
tinued constitutes investment property. Whether property is investment
property is to be determined by the type of income received from the
property and also the type of activity in which the property is used.41
First, the property must be held for the production of passive income,
such as dividends, interest, rents, royalties, or capital gains. Second,
property will not be considered investment property to the extent it is
used in a trade or business activity even though it produces passive in-
come. For this purpose the active use of passive income-producing
property in a trade or business is required rather than the mere holding
of the property in the trade or business. For example, even though a
portfolio investment is held in a trade or business, it will be con-
sidered to be investment property. In addition, investment property
generally includes corporate stock even if it represents a controlling
interest.
Although the present (and the proposed) limitation on investment
interest is not generally directed to interest arising in a business context,
there is one exception to this general rule in the case of net leased
property.42 Even though property which is leased would otherwise be
respects identical to those contained in section 57 regarding investment interest,
under which regulations have been proposed, the proposed section 57 regulations
are referred to herein.
40The proposed regulations also provide that the purpose of a borrowing may
change with the passage of time, such as from a loan incurred to acquire business
property to a loan continued to carry (i.e., avoid the liquidation of) investment
property.
41 Prop. Reg. § 1.57-2(b) (2).
42 Sec. 164(d) (4) (A) and proposed sec. 164(d) (5) (A), H.R. 10612, § 206. For
a detailed discussion of the net lease rules under the investment interest deduc-
tion, see Bedell, "The Interest Deduction: Its Current Status," 32 N.Y.U. Inst. on
Fed. Tax, 1135-38 (1974.
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treated as used in a trade or business, it is considered to be investment
property if it is leased by the taxpayer under a net lease. For this
purpose, a lease is considered to be a net lease if the taxpayer's section
162 business expenses in connection with the lease are a small portion
(less than 15 percent) of the gross rental income from the leased
property or if the taxpayer-lessor is guaranteed a specified return or
is guaranteed in whole or in part against loss of income under the
lease.
As indicated above, the general approach of present law is to con-
sider interest paid or accrued by a taxpayer as investment interest sub-
ject to the limitation of present law unless the loan in question can be
directly related to a personal or business activity. Although the defini-
tion of investment interest would remain unchanged under the Ways
and Means Committee's tax reform bill, this emphasis would be changed
and, as a result, difficult questions may arise. Presumably because a
stricter limitation would be imposed under the bill on personal interest
than on investment interest, it is provided that a taxpayer's interest
is presumed to be personal interest unless the taxpayer can establish
that it is either business interest or investment interest.4 Thus, interest
on a home mortgage loan would be presumed to be personal interest.
This presumption could be overcome, however, if the taxpayer could
establish that the loan proceeds were used by him for an investment
or business purpose. The Ways and Means Committee indicated that
this could occur, for example, where a taxpayer who was unable to
obtain a loan for use in his business without providing additional
security took out a second mortgage on his house to obtain the neces-
sary funds.44
The situation posed by the Committee, however, is a relatively clear
one. The troublesome questions that will arise as a result of the shift
in emphasis from investment interest to personal interest will occur
in those cases where the taxpayer has mixed motives for a borrowing,
which is not infrequently the case. A typical situation would be that
of a taxpayer with a substantial investment portfolio who needs funds
for a personal purpose, such as purchasing a boat or a summer cottage.
Rather than liquidating a portion of his investments, the taxpayer ob-
tains a personal loan. In this type of situation, the taxpayer has dual
motives: He wishes to obtain funds for a personal purpose and he
also desires to continue to hold his investment assets. Under present
law, it is likely that the taxpayer would be considered to have obtained
the loan in order to carry his investments and, accordingly, the interest
on the loan would be treated as investment interest subject to the
limitation of section 163(d). Similarly, if the taxpayer held a sub-
stantial amount of tax-exempt municipal bonds in his investment port-
folio, it is likely that he would be treated under section 265(2) as
4SProposed sec. 164(d) (4) (A) (ii), H.R. 10612, § 206.
44 H. Rep. No. 94-658, 103.
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having obtained the loan to carry the tax-exempt bonds and, ac-
cordingly, would not be allowed to deduct the interest on the loan."
Under the proposed nonbusiness interest limitation, however, the
interest would be presumed to be personal interest rather than invest-
ment interest. Would the rules developed under present law (sections
163(d) and 265(2)) be sufficient to overcome the presumption so the
interest would be treated as investment interest? If the loan were
iecured by the taxpayer's investments, it clearly would be treated as
incurred to continue the investments under the principles of section
265(2) and presumably also under the present rules of section 163(d).
Would the presumption be overcome in this type of situation so
the loan would be treated as incurred for investment purposes? If,
because more stringent limitations are imposed on personal interest
than on investment interest under the proposed nonbusiness interest
limitation, it is decided that the presumption is not overcome in these
examples, then taxpayers will be faced with conflicting and contradic-
tory rules under section 163(d) and section 265(2). It is even possible
that a given loan might be treated as a personal loan under the non-
business interest limitation of section 163 (d) and also as a loan incurred
to carry tax-exempt bonds under section 265(2). On the other hand,
given the circumstances of the taxpayer, it may well be that the
rules developed under one of these provisions will be useful to the
taxpayer in avoiding the application of the other provision.
Net Investment Income
As previously indicated, a taxpayer's investment interest in excess
of the dollar limitation (of present law or of the proposed nonbusiness
interest limitation) nevertheless is currently deductible by the taxpayer
to the extent of his net investment income. For this purpose, net in-
vestment income generally means the taxpayer's passive income from
property held for investment 46 less his investment expenses. Passive
income which is derived in a trade or business, such as royalties re-
ceived by a manufacturer or dividends received by a securities dealer,
is not considered investment income. On the other hand, income which
is derived from the temporary or incidental use of property in a trade
45See text, infra, under "Interest on Indebtedness Incurred or Continued to
Purchase or Carry Tax-Exempt Bonds."
46Passive income for this purpose means dividends, interest, rents, royalties,
net short-term capital gains on the disposition of investment property, and amounts
which are treated as ordinary income upon the disposition of investment property
under the depreciation recapture provisions of sections 1245 and 1250. Under the
proposed nonbusiness interest deduction limitation, investment income also would
include ordinary income amounts arising under the proposed recapture rule for
intangible drilling and development costs (proposed secs. 164(d) (4) (C) (iii) and
proposed sec. 1254, H.R. 10612, § 202).
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or business will nevertheless be considered investment income if the
property is held primarily for investment purposes.4 7
The expenses which are taken into account in determining the
amount of the taxpayer's net investment income are his trade or
business expenses, real and personal property taxes, bad debt deductions,
depreciation and depletion, amortizable bond premium and his section
212 expenses.48 These types of expenses, however, are taken into ac-
count only to the extent they are directly connected with the pro-
duction of investment income. Under present law, even though a
taxpayer claims accelerated depreciation or percentage depletion, he
is allowed to take into account only straight line depreciation or cost
depletion in determining the amount of his net investment income.49
This special rule would not apply under the Ways and Means Com-
mittee's proposed nonbusiness interest limitation and, accordingly, a
taxpayer would be required in determining his net investment income
to reduce his gross investment income by the actual amount of the
accelerated depreciation or percentage depletion deductions claimed
by him.50
Out-of-Pocket Losses
Under both present law and the proposed nonbusiness interest limita-
tion, investment interest is and would continue to be deductible to
the extent of any actual out-of-pocket economic loss suffered by a
taxpayer in connection with net leased property if the taxpayer is
actually receiving rents from the lessee.61 His out-of-pocket loss for
this purpose is the excess of the amount of the taxpayer's trade or
business expenses, investment expenses, interest, and deductible real
or personal property taxes attributable to the net leased property over
the amount of rents received by the taxpayer from the property. This
rule recognizes that where a taxpayer is actually renting property but
nevertheless incurs an economic loss, the loss is not an artificial one
incurred for tax shelter purposes, and, therefore, to that extent it is
inappropriate to deny the interest deduction.
Carryover of Disallo'wed Interest
The present limitation on the deduction of investment interest pro-
vides a carryover for interest which is not currently deductible under
the limitation.52 Under this carryover, which is unlimited in time,
excess investment interest paid or accrued in a taxable year may be
deducted by the taxpayer in a subsequent taxable year to the extent
4 7 Prop. Reg. 5 1.57-2(b) (4).4s Sec. 163(d) (3) (C) and proposed sec. 163(d) (4) (D), H.R. 10612, S 206.
49 Sec. 164(d) (3) (C).
6 oProposed sec. 163 (d) (4) (D).
51 Sec. 163(d) (1) (B) and proposed sec. 163 (d) (2) (B), H.R. 10612, S 206.
52 Sec. 163 (d) (2).
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of one-half the amount of the taxpayer's net investment income in
the subsequent year which is not offset by that year's investment in-
terest. A taxpayer's net investment income in a subsequent year for
this purpose is considered to have been offset by that year's invest-
ment interest only to the extent the investment interest exceeds $25,000.
Apparently, the 50-percent-of-net-income limitation on the use of
a carryover of disallowed interest was adopted to produce the same
total amount of investment interest deduction under the carryover rule
as would have been allowable if the taxable year in which the interest
was paid or accrued and the carryover year were treated as only one
taxable period. Stated differently, the rule produces the same total
deduction that would have resulted if the investment income in the
carryover year which is not offset by that year's investment interest
had arisen in the earlier year in which the investment interest being
carried over was paid or incurred.58
In addition, under present law a special rule applicable in the carry-
over year correlates the amount of a taxpayer's excess investment in-
terest carryover with the amount of the long-term capital gains
deduction allowed the taxpayer for that carryover year.54
Under the Ways and Means Committee's proposed nonbusi.
interest limitation, a simpler and more liberal carryover for excess
investment interest would be allowed. The bill would simply provide
that investment interest which is not currently deductible solely be-
cause of the investment interest limitation is to be treated as investment
interest paid or incurred in the following taxable year.55 Accordingly,
this disallowed investment interest would simply be aggregated under
the carryover rule with the amount of investment interest paid or
incurred by the taxpayer in the carryover year and would be deductible
to the extent permitted under the nonbusiness interest limitation in that
subsequent year. Because there would be no time limit on the carryover
of excess investment interest, it is not necessary to distinguish in a carry-
over year between the investment interest paid or incurred by the tax-
payer in that year and the excess investment interest from previous
years which is being carried over to that subsequent year.
In addition to being substantially simpler, the proposed excess in-
vestment interest carryover rule is also more liberal than the carryover
rule contained in present law. Under the proposed rule, excess invest-
ment interest which is carried over to a subsequent year may be offset
against any portion of the taxpayer's $12,000 allowance in the carryover
year which is not used up by that year's personal or investment interest.
Under present law, this is not the case. Even though a taxpayer has
no investment interest in the carryover year, excess investment interest
63 See Bedell, "The Interest Deduction: Its Current Status," 32 N.Y.U. Inst. on
Fed. Tax, 1130-31 (1974), regarding the carryover rule.54 Sec. 164(d) (2) (B).
5Proposed sec. 164(d) (3), H.R. 10612, S 206.
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from a prior taxable year may not be offset in a carryover year against
the taxpayer's $25,000 allowance for that year.56
Subchapter S Corporations and Partnerships
In the case of partnerships and subchapter S corporations, the
present limitation on the deduction of investment interest and the
proposed nonbusiness interest deduction limitation is applied at the
partner and shareholder level rather than at the partnership or corpora-
tion level.57 A partner or a subchapter S corporation shareholder
separately takes into account his distributive share of the entity's
relevant income and expense items (i.e., the entity's investment interest,
investment income and expenses and other items pertinent to the
application of the limitation). The individual then aggregates his
distributive share of these items with his own investment interest
income and expense for purposes of the limitation. In this regard, it
is not clear what happens in the situation in which the partner or share-
holder is allowed to deduct some, but not all, of his share of the
partnership or corporation's loss for the year because the loss exceeds
the basis of his partnership interest or of his stock and debt in the
corporation.58 The question in this situation is whether the partner
or shareholder in fact would otherwise be receiving a deduction for all
or a portion of the entity's investment interest. In other words, is
the amount of the loss which the taxpayer is not allowed to deduct
composed in whole or in part of the entity's investment interest or
does it represent some other item of expense?
Interest on Indebtedness Incurred or Continued to
Purchase or Carry Tax-Exempt Bonds
Since the mid-1960's a number of cases have been decided construing
the rule found for over 50 years in section 265(2) and its predecessors
that no deduction is to be allowed for interest on indebtedness incurred
or continued to purchase or carry tax-exempt bonds.59 In general, the
courts have held that the interest deduction is to be disallowed under
section 265(2) only if the borrowing in question was made or con-
tinued for the proscribed purpose or has a sufficiently direct relationship
to the purchasing or carrying of tax-exempts. In determining whether
the proscribed purpose-relationship exists in a given factual situation,
66 Sec. 164(d) (2).
57 Sec. 163 (d) (4) (B) and (C), and proposed sec. 164(d) (5) (B) and (C), H.R.
10612, S 206.
58A partner may not currently deduct his share of a partnership loss to the
extent it exceeds the adjusted basis of his partnership interest. Sec. 704(d). A
similar rule is applicable in the case of a shareholder of a subchapter S corpora-
don. Sec. 1374(c) (2).
59The Revenue Act of 1918 contained the original predecessor of section
265(2).
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the courts have in essence employed two principles to establish the
proscribcd purpose-relationship: a direct tracing principle and a lack
of reasonable business or economic justification principle.
The proscribed purpose-relationship has been found to exist where
there is a direct tracing between the borrowing and the tax-exempt
obligations. Such a direct tracing exists where the tax-exempts are
purchased with the proceeds of the loan, are pledged as collateral
for the loan,60 or where the tax-exempt obligations and the loan pro-
ceeds are held in the same account and the amount of the borrowing
is directly related to the amount of the tax-exempt bonds.6'
If the loan proceeds are not directly traceable to the tax-exempts
in the manner described above, then it generally has been held that
the interest deduction is to be disallowed under section 265(2) if
the taxpayer does not have a reasonable business or economic justifica-
tion for concurrently holding the tax-exempts and also having the
loan outstanding. For example, in Illinois Terminal Railroad Com-
pany, 2 the taxpayer-railroad purchased the assets of another railroad
entirely with borrowed funds. After approximately two years, the
taxpayer sold the most substantial of the acquired assets to a municipal-
ity for cash and tax-exempt bonds of the municipality. The taxpayer
used the cash to reduce the outstanding balance on its original loan but
then continued for a number of years to hold most of the tax-exempt
bonds and to keep most of the balance of the original JPan outstanding
to provide it with working capital. The court, however, concluded
that the taxpayer did not have a reasonable justification for holding the
tax-exempts and at the same time continuing the bank loan because
it could have sold the tax-exempt bonds and used the proceeds to
pay off its debt without impairing its capital needs.
Similarly, in Indian Trail Trading Post, Inc.,68 it was found that the
taxpayer did not have a reasonable business justification for acquiring
tax-exempts while continuing to have a loan outstanding. In this case,
the taxpayer obtained permanent financing for a new store in a shop-
ping center owned by the taxpayer and used a portion of the loan to
pay off the interim construction loan on the store. It placed the balance
of the borrowing in its general funds and 8 months later purchased tax-
exempt bonds. At the time the tax-exempt bonds were purchased,
the taxpayer had an amount of cash in excess of its current business
needs. Although the taxpayer noted some possible future business needs
that might require funds, the Court concluded there was not a reason-
60 Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968).
61 Wynn v. United States, 288 F.Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
411 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970). See also Kirchner,
Moore & Co, 54 T.C. 940 (1970), aff'd 448 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1971).62 Illinois Terminal Railroad Co. v. United States, 375 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Ca. 1967).
68 Indian Trail Trading Post, Inc., 60 T.C. 497 (1973) aff'd 503 F.2d 102 (6th
Cir. 1974).
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able business justification for the concurrent existence of the loan and
the tax-exempts, and, accordingly, found the proscribed purpose to be
present.
On the other hand, taxpayers have been found to have a reasonable
justification for the concurrent existence of a loan and the holding of
tax-exempts, and, thus, the proscribed purpose-relationship has not
been found to be present, in situations where the taxpayer while
holding tax-exempts obtained a loan to finance a major nonrecurring
expenditure, such as a mortgage loan obtained in order to build a new
plant." In another situation in which a reasonable justification was
found to exist,65 the taxpayer was required to borrow funds to meet
an unanticipated and immediate need, which had arisen because of cir-
cumstances beyond its control, for cash to carry on its normal business
operations. Liquidation of its holdings of tax-exempt obligations would
not have been a feasible method of obtaining the needed funds since the
amount of the tax-exempts was substantially less than the amount of
funds needed by the taxpayer and about one-half of the tax-exempts
were otherwise pledged with the Federal Reserve Bank.
In two recent cases, the Tax Court evidenced a more liberal attitude
than prior cases in finding that the taxpayers had a reasonable business
justification for the concurrent existence of loans and tax-exempt
bonds. In one case,66 the two principal shareholder-executives of the
taxpayer corporation were at odds with each other and also pursued an
extremely conservative fiscal policy of no debt financing and compara-
tively small expenditures for necessary extensive plant and equipment
modernization and expansion. Because of these factors, the business
needs of the corporation could not be met and for many years it
accumulated its excess funds in substantial amounts of taxable and tax-
exempt securities. Then, to resolve the shareholder disputes, the cor-
poration redeemed the stock of one of the principal shareholders and
paid a substantial part of the redemption price in 6-year installment
notes. Subsequently, the corporation's tax-exempt bonds were sold or
matured and the proceeds used for the needed plant modernization. The
Tax Court held that in these circumstances the corporation had a
reasonable business justification for concurrently holding the tax-exempt
bonds and having the installment notes outstanding.
In the second case, 67 the taxpayer-corporation, because of business
reversals, extended the term of 40-year bonds it had issued to its or-
ganizers at incorporation in exchange for land they transferred to it.
Approximately five years after the extension, shareholders who owned
49YA percent of the stock in the corporation made detailed and con-
64Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968).
65 Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corp. v. United States, 321 F.Supp. 222
(E.D. Va. 1971).
66 Handy Button Machine Co., 61 T.C. 846 (1974), A. 1974-2 C.B. 2.
67 Swenson Land and Cattle Co., 64 T.C. No. 68 (1975).
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crete proposals for an expansion of the corporation's business. The
corporation had followed a conservative business pattern in the past
in that it had maintained very substantial reserves to meet the working
capital needs of its seasonal business and also had accumulated funds
for the retirement of its bonds. These funds had been maintained in a
very liquid portfolio of taxable securities. Shortly before the expansion
proposal was made, the portfolio was largely converted into liquid
tax-exempt securities maturing within a year in order to obtain higher
after-tax yields. This portfolio was maintained and expanded through
investment of surplus funds during the period the expansion proposals
were under consideration. The corporation continued its indebtedness
during this period to provide funds both to meet its working capital
needs, consistent with its past practices, and also to provide the possible
additional funds required if the proposed expansion plan were adopted.
After serious consideration of the expansion proposals, they were re-
jected and on the next prepayment date the corporation prepaid a
substantial portion of its outstanding indebtedness. These circum-
stances were considered by the Tax Court to evidence a reasonable
business justification for the concurrent existence of the tax-exempts
and the indebtedness and, accordingly, the proscribed purpose-relation-
ship was not found to be present.
Where the taxpayer is an individual rather than a corporation, how-
ever, it generally is more difficult to establish that the proscribed
purpose-relationship is not present, especially if the taxpayer is en-
gaged in investment, rather than trade or business, activities. For ex-
ample, in one recent case 68 a doctor and his wife undertook an in-
vestment program which included the purchase of tax-exempt bonds
during a period of substantially rising income. During this period, the
taxpayers purchased a new home for cash, maintained substantial liquid
balances (approximately $100,000) in their checking and savings ac-
counts, and then subsequently obtained a $37,200 mortgage loan on
their new home. The business and economic reasons offered by the
taxpayers for obtaining the home mortgage loan was that it was needed
to pay the balance of their prior years' federal income tax liability in
approximately the same amount and to finance the purchase of certain
X-ray equipment. The Tax Court in denying the deduction for the
interest on the mortgage loan concluded that in reality the purpose
of the loan was to assist the taxpayers in their investment program
which included the acquisition and carrying of tax-exempt bonds.
Similarly, in Israelson v. United States,69 a taxpayer who held a large
amount of tax-exempt obligations and at the same time continued a
bank loan, the bulk of the proceeds of which were used for making
stock and bond investments, was found to not have a reasonable justifi-
68 Amedeo Louis Mariorenzi, 32 T.C.M. 681 (1973), aff'd per curiam, 490 F.d
92 (1st Cir. 1974).
6 367 FSupp. 1104 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd mem. 508 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1974).
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cation for the concurrent existence of the tax-exempt bonds and the
loan. At most points during the period in question, the amount of the
tax exempt bonds held by the taxpayer was substantially in excess of
the amount of his bank loan.
Another type of investment program involving concurrent borrow-
ings and the holding and acquisition of tax-exempt bonds was found in
Levitt v. United States 70 to be lacking in any reasonable business or
economic justification. In this case, the taxpayer, during a period in
which tax-exempt obligations were held and additional obligations ac-
quired, borrowed to purchase U. S. obligations which 'Were redeemable
at face to pay estate taxes. The additional tax-exempt bonds were
purchased with income of the taxpayer from other sources and then
the borrowings were made to acquire the U. S. bonds. The court
found that the only benefit to the taxpayer was the overall tax savings
it would achieve and did not consider this a reasonable economic justi-
fication for the taxpayer's activity.
On the other hand, where an individual taxpayer incurs debts in
connection with business ventures such as investments in real estate
projects or joint ventures, ranches, and oil drilling ventures, and at
the same time has a relatively insignificant amount of tax-exempt bonds
in his investment portfolio, the courts generally have found that the
taxpayer had a reasonable economic and business justification for in-
curring these debts and at the same time holding the tax-exempt obliga-
tions.71 It is important to note, however, that in the cases where the
interest deduction was allowed because of the existence of a reason-
able business or economic justification, there was no direct tracing be-
tween the loans in question and the tax-exempt obligations. That such
a direct tracing will overcome an otherwise reasonable business justifi-
cation is illustrated in the Levitt case. There, the District Court allowed
the taxpayer to deduct the interest he incurred on loans obtained in con-
nection with long-term real estate investments and a nonrecurring
major business investment.72 On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit
focused on the fact that the taxpayer had pledged his tax-exempt ob-
ligations as part of the collateral for the loans in question, and, to this
extent, the court found the requisite direct tracing to exist. Accord-
ingly, it held that, notwithstanding the apparently reasonable business
justification, a proportionate part of the interest on the loans was to
be disallowed.78
7075-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9508 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'g and remanding 368 F.Supp. 644
(S.D. Iowa 1974).
71Edmund F. Ball, 54 T.C. 1200 (1970); Batten v. United States, 322 F.Supp.
629 (E.D. Va. 1971).72 Levitt v. United States, 368 F.Supp. 644 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
7 8 Levitt v. United States, 75-1 U.S.T.C. 9508 (8th Cir. 1975). Since the tax-
payer in this case had relatively large holdings of tax-exempt bonds, it is possible
that the Court of Appeals might have concluded, in the absence of a direct
tracing, that a reasonable justification for the concurrent existence of the loans
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In applying section 265(2) the courts have consistently stated that
it is not mechanical in operation and "it does not become operative
merely because the taxpayer incurred or continued indebtedness at the
same time it held tax-exempt securities. Rather, the Commissioner
must establish a sufficiently direct relationship between the debt and the
carrying of the tax-exempt bonds." 74 As indicated above, the pro-
scribed relationship is considered to exist to the extent that there is
a direct tracing between the indebtedness and the tax-exempts. Even
where there is no direct tracing, the proscribed purpose-relationship
is considered to exist, if the taxpayer does not have a reasonable business
or economic justification for the concurrent holding of the tax-exempts
and the existence of the indebtedness. In the Leslie and Bradford cases,75
partnerships engaged in the securities brokerage business borrowed
and repaid funds on a day-to-day basis in connection with the carrying
on of their securities businesses, which included the purchase and sale
of tax-exempt bonds. The Second Circuit disallowed a deduction in
Leslie for the portion of the partnership's interest expenses that was
allocable to its holdings of tax-exempts. The court found the pro-
scribed purpose-relationship to exist because the partnership took its
intended purchases of tax-exempts into account in computing its daily
cash needs for borrowing purposes and presumably would have had
to borrow less had it not held the tax-exempts. In Bradford, the
Tax Court followed the position of the Second Circuit enunciated in
Leslie.
One of the dissenting opinions in Bradford suggested that these two
cases depart from the approach of the other section 265(2) cases and
instead set forth the mechanical principle that section 265(2) is opera-
tive whenever a taxpayer has both tax-exempts and an indebtedness out-
standing. These cases, however, do not go as far as suggested by the
dissenting opinion and indeed are consistent with the other section
265(2) cases. The distinguishing factor in this regard is that in Leslie
and Bradford the borrowings in question were incurred in connection
with all of the activities of the brokerage businesses, including the ac-
quisition and carrying of tax-exempt bonds. In other words, the acquisi-
tion of the tax-exempts contributed at least in part to the need for
the borrowings. In the other section 265(2) cases which did not in-
volve a direct tracing and where the courts thus proceeded to as-
and the tax-exempts did not exist. The court alluded to, but did not pass on, this
question in view of the existence of direct tracing. Compare Batten and Ball(fn. 71) in which the relative holdings of tax-exempt bonds were quite small.74 Israelson v. United States, 367 F.Supp. 1104, 1106 (D. Md. 1973), affd mere.
508 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1974). The Revenue Service, however, does take a more
mechanical view of section 265(2). Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740, as modified
by Rev. Proc. 74-8, 1974-1 C.B. 419.75 Leslie v. Comm'r, 413 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969), reu'g 50 T.C. 11 (1968); James
C. Bradford, 60 T.C. 253 (1973).
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certain whether there was a reasonable business or economic justifica-
tion for the concurrent existence of the indebtedness and the tax-
exempts, the event occasioning the borrowing did not involve even
in part the acquisition of tax-exempts.
Viewed in this manner, it would appear that Leslie and Bradford are
in fact cases in which the proscribed purpose-relationship was estab-
lished by a type of direct tracing since one of the purposes of the
borrowings in these cases was to acquire tax-exempts. In view of the
fact that there was a direct tracing, it was not necessary for the courts
to proceed to the further inquiry whether the concurrent existence
of the indebtedness and the tax-exempt obligations had a reasonable
business or economic purpose. Such an inquiry is necessary only where
the proscribed purpose-relationship is not established by a direct
tracing. Accordingly, it does not appear that the Leslie and Bradford
cases set forth a mechanical principle for the application of section
265(2); rather, the approach employed in Leslie and Bradford is con-
sistent with that which has been developed by the courts in other
section 265(2) cases. This is further demonstrated by the fact that
cases subsequent to Leslie and Bradford have neither construed them
as adopting such a mechanical principle nor applied such a principle.
Tax Avioidance Transactions
Over the years taxpayers have attempted to devise tax-saving trans-
actions to produce a large interest deduction which is then used to
shelter other unrelated income from tax. As discussed above, prepay-
ments of interest have been used for this purpose in recent times. A
more complex type of transaction which was designed to produce a
substantial interest deduction, but little else, originated in the early
1950's and is known as the "Livingstone transaction." Generally, this
type of transaction involves the purchase of a substantial amount of
U. S. Treasury obligations, and the financing of all or almost all of the
purchase price of the obligations by a loan for which the obligations
are pledged as security. Often, interest on the loan is prepaid to further
enhance the tax-saving potential. In one variation of the Livingstone
transaction, the Treasury obligations are purchased from, and the
loan is obtained from, the same person, often a promoter. In another
variation of the Livingstone transaction, the loan in question is obtained
from an independent financial institution.
By and large, taxpayers have been unsuccessful in securing the in-
terest deduction intended to be produced by these tax-saving schemes.
The courts have employed two basic approaches to deny the interest
deduction. In cases where the obligations were purchased from, and the
loan made by, the same person, the courts have concluded that the
transaction was a sham and, accordingly, resulted in no valid indebted-
ness which could support an interest deduction. In the cases where the
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loan in question was obtained from an independent financial institution
and, thus, involved a valid indebtedness, the courts have disallowed the
interest deduction on the basis that the transaction must have a purpose
other than the obtaining of an interest deduction. In other words, it
has been held that the deduction will not be allowed if, considering
the facts surrounding the transaction, it is apparent that the taxpayer
did not, and could not, have had any reason for entering into the
transaction other than to secure the benefit of the interest deduction.
Sham Transactions
In Knetsch v. United States,76 the Supreme Court applied the sham
transaction approach to deny the interest deduction in a tax-saving
transaction. In this case, the taxpayer purchased 2Y2 percent single
premium annuity bonds from an insurance company and financed 99.9
percent of the purchase price by giving the insurance company 3 %
percent nonrecourse notes that were secured by the bonds. Since the
taxpayer borrowed the annual increase in the cash value of the bonds
attributable to the 2Y / percent interest factor to meet a substantial
portion of the required interest payments on the notes, his equity in
the bonds would never increase. The Supreme Court concluded that
the transaction was a sham noting that "There was nothing of sub-
stance to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction beyond a tax
deduction."
In other cases in which the sham transaction approach has been
employed to deny the interest deduction, the fact that the transaction
is a sham has been even more apparent.77 Often in these cases, the
bonds purchased by the taxpayer were immediately resold to the pro-
moter and thus the transaction was viewed as involving mere paper
shuffling over a short period of time without any real purchase of
government obligations or any real borrowing.
Interest Deduction Sole Purpose of Transaction
Prior to 1966 if a taxpayer borrowed the amount necessary to finance
the investment in his tax-saving scheme from an independent financial
institution, the courts generally found that a valid indebtedness had
been created and, accordingly, that the interest deduction was not to
be disallowed under the sham transaction approach.78
In 1966, the Second Circuit in considering a tax-saving transaction
involving a valid debt in the Goldstein79 case formulated the principle
76 364 US. 361 (1960).
77 See Kanter, "The Interest Deduction: When and How Does it Work," 26
N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax., 87, 97 (1968), for a comprehensive discussion of the
sham transaction cases.
78See, e.g., John Loughran, 19 T.C.M. 1193 (1960), appeal dism'd (4th Cir.
1961).79 Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 US. 1005
(1967).
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that the interest deduction could be denied on the basis that the trans-
action had no purpose other than the obtaining of an interest deduction.
In this case, the taxpayer used the proceeds of 4-percent loans obtained
from independent financial institutions to purchase 1Y percent Trea-
sury notes. The notes were pledged as security for the loans. The
interest on the loans were prepaid and a deduction for the interest
was claimed, primarily to offset a substantial amount won by the tax-
payer in the Irish Sweepstakes. The Second Circuit, noting that the
taxpayer had no prospect of sufficient appreciation to offset the eco-
nomic loss from the interest rate differential between the Treasury
notes and the loan, held that the taxpayer had no realistic expectation
of economic profit from the transactions and had entered into them
solely to secure a large interest deduction to offset her sweepstakes
winnings. On this basis, the court denied the claimed interest deduction.
This principle was reaffirmed by the Second Circuit less than two
years later when in the Lifschultz 0 case it considered a similar trans-
action which involved both an economic loss to the taxpayer on the
interest rate differential and a very remote chance of sufficient ap-
preciation resulting from the bond investment to offset that economic
loss. As in Goldstein, the court denied the interest deduction on the
basis that the transaction was entered into without any realistic ex-
pectation of economic profit and solely as a means of securing the in-
terest deduction. The Goldstein principle has also been considered by
the Court of Claims and has been applied by that court to deny the
interest deduction in a similar type of tax-saving transaction which
involved a valid indebtedness.81
In the Estate of Frank Cohen82 the Tax Court applied the Goldstein
principle to deny the interest deduction in the case of a tax-saving
transaction in which the interest rate differential did not produce an
economic loss to the taxpayer. Although the obligations acquired by
the taxpayer with borrowed funds had a higher interest rate than the
loan in question, the obligations were purchased at a premium. If
held to maturity and redeemed at par (as they in fact were), a loss
would be produced that would cause an overall economic loss on the
transaction. The court concluded that the taxpayer had entered into
the transaction solely to secure an interest deduction because of both
the remote possibility of an economic profit on the transaction and the
taxpayer's actual conduct in not selling the obligations prior to maturity
at a price which exceeded his purchase price.
Although the courts in discussing the Goldstein principle have
often characterized it in broad terms as a business purpose requirement
80Lifschultz v. Comrr'r, 393 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g 25 T.C.M. 1146
(1966).
81 Rothschild v. United States, 407 F2d 404 (Ct. Cl. 1969). This case also con-
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or a purposive activity requirement, up to now the principle has
been confined in application to those limited situations where the loan
in question served no purpose other than the securing of an interest
deduction. In other words, to date it has been applied to deny the
interest deduction only in the situation where the lack of any realistic
possibility of economic gain has demonstrated that the securing of
an interest deduction was the only purpose of the taxpayer in enter-
ing into the transaction in question.
